Published in 1940, the Small Wars Manual (SWM) tells of lessons learned over the 20 years that the U.S. Marine Corps fought small “Banana Wars” (now known as insurgencies) where they occupied and administered several Latin American nations and learned the utmost importance of understanding local realities.  The SWM made great attempts to show the need to understand how the military sees the world just as the military needs to understand how the world sees it and why.  When boiled down to exclude obsolete sections, the SWM serves as a sort of timeless guide to engage in ethnographic understanding.

The U.S. cannot, as Council on Foreign Relations President, Richard Haas argues, maintain policy choices in the Middle East that “lie between preoccupation and disengagement.”  Since militarily disbanding a state and security apparatus, as was the case in Iraq a decade ago, is an unwanted and unrealistic option, perhaps in Syria we should heed the lessons of decades past:

“A serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development [is of primary importance]. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussions to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated.”

Such words from the SWM ring of the power of cultural understanding of the local population, a concept that has both deterred the U.S. from arming the Syrian opposition and may also be useful in assessing the effectiveness of other forms of aid. If it were not for the ubiquitous rise of radical jihadists and al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, the U.S. may very well have already provided increased military support to the Syrian opposition movement.  If there is one lesson to learn from the U.S. arming the Afghan mujahidin that would eventually lead to Taliban rule, it is that political, economic and cultural disengagement after the fall of a regime is the most direct route to instability. Therefore, efforts to invest in and supply the appropriate groups, something the U.S. has been privy to but not directly involved, are only the tip of the iceberg.

To understand how to engage in a country that has seen military action for millennia, perhaps we should invest more heavily in a manual that can help build movements of conscience through cultural understanding and engagement with and within a country.  Maybe that way, people can hold their leaders to account before real and tragic abuses serve as the rallying cry for the use of force.

Al-Qaeda “franchises” have become fairly prevalent over the past decade as the group was driven out of Afghanistan with its senior leadership establishing safe havens in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Regions and promoting the rise of regional affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). However, with significant blows to its leadership and recruitment efforts, the group has turned to the instability caused by the Arab Spring for members to replenish itself. Since the beginning of protests across the Middle East over two years ago, many Salafi and Islamist Jihad groups with questionable ties to the dominant terror organization have emerged under the name of Ansar al-Sharia. These groups use political turmoil to promulgate their cause in countries such as Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Morocco.

Though many of these new groups may only tacitly acknowledge an affiliation with al-Qaeda, Syria’s al-Nusra has done just the opposite, publicly proclaiming its association with AQI. Starting out as one of many militant groups in the Free Syrian Army fight against the Assad regime, at over 5,000 men strong, al-Nusra has a reputation as being the most respected rebel group due to its disciplined fighters and  past victories against the Assad regime.  Al-Nusra is notorious for its violence and suicide bombings and has also been outspoken in regard to its plans for Syria after the current regime falls: building up and establishing a jihadist network under a common identity in the name of Islam, instituting Sharia Law, and establishing an Islamic Caliphate (the Levant). The creation of its own Sharia court in Syria has also helped al-Nusra gain ground amidst political instability and lack of rule of law.

While the “traditional” threat of al-Qaeda may appear to be waning, these franchised or marginally-affiliated groups may pose an even greater threat to U.S. interests as they do not subscribe to one doctrine or strategy, tend to be locally-embedded and sometimes garner the support of local populations due to their security-providing role. In many cases, weeding out jihadists from legitimate revolutionaries is an impossible goal, making decisions about arming opposition movements even more difficult, especially in the case of Syria. For other nations experiencing their own Islamist insurgencies and al-Qaeda resurgence, the key to defeating these groups lies in the state establishing stability and security to starve them of rhetorical fodder, further recruitment and ungoverned safe-havens.

In a recent testimony in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, identified cybersecurity as the number one threat to national security. Surpassing terrorism, the threat of cyber-attacks is gaining more attention from the government in more ways than one.  Recent cyber-attacks have been launched on defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, the International Monetary Fund, and private U.S. banks, among others. The growing capabilities of hackers in countries such as China, Russia, and Iran has prompted a whole-of-government approach to combat this rising threat.

Obama’s 2014 budget proposal recognizes this threat by substantially increasing investment in cybersecurity efforts. Most notably, the proposed budget would increase spending on cybersecurity to $4.7 billion, up more than $800 million from last year’s budget. Specific budgetary investments relating to defense include approximately $40 billion on information technology, allotted to the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice to combat cybersecurity threats. Further, the National Institute of Standards and Technology would receive a $100 million boost from last year’s funding.

Governmental efforts to thwart cyber-attacks have been around since the 1990’s. However, as a result of rising threats, more attention was placed on cybersecurity during the Bush administration, with the advent of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative in 2008.  In addition, two main governmental initiatives, the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, and the Einstein 2 & 3 programs, have been establishing a front line of defense against cyber-attacks for years. On top of current initiatives, more legislation is in the works to build up adequate cyber warfare defenses.  Just last week, the House passed the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), which will allow businesses and the government to share information regarding cyber-attacks. Civil liberties groups are outraged at this bill due to its implications for privacy protection, as it will allow companies to share personal information with government agencies. The U.S. government will have to walk a fine line between ensuring protection from cyber-attacks while not breaching American citizens’ rights to privacy.

White House budget proposals usually act as indicators of the current administration’s top priorities, but with imminent cuts to almost every sector, many have argued that there are no more “sacred cows.” Many Americans have come to believe that the Pentagon’s inflated budget does not necessarily translate into a proportionately prepared and equipped defensive force. However, politicians and 50% of the general public agree that cyber-attacks pose a serious problem for the United States. As cyber-attacks against the homeland become increasingly abundant, the public is more likely to support investing a higher portion of the scarce budget in offensive and defensive cyber initiatives.

New forums for social interaction have provided worldwide access to an endless supply of information and news.  As a result, power has shifted from large traditional information providers, such as governments and the mainstream media, to the citizens themselves.  Oscar Morales’s One Million Voices Against FARC is one of social media’s first success stories, as Morales was able to mobilize millions of Colombians against terrorism using Facebook. The movement started by providing the public with the face of a victim, in this case the child of a FARC rape victim, whose story was circulating around the news at the same time.  This timing caused the movement to go viral gaining thousands of supporters on Facebook within hours of its inception.  Rather than let one image define his movement, Morales continued to provide information to his network. Through social media, he was able to organize the movement to reveal more victims to the public, to provide videos, photos, and information against the FARC.  This movement spread across the globe, leading to demonstrations around the world with millions of people in attendance.

In addition to giving social media users the power of information, the new leaderless format of movements has helped to create anonymity for the founders of movements and protect their members. For example, We are All Khaled Said, an influential movement against the Egyptian Government in the weeks leading up to the Egyptian Revolt, was able to use anonymous social media accounts to provide a level of secrecy necessary to evade the dangers of government persecution and punishment.  Additionally, Facebook and other media outlets allowed the movement to connect with other networks and movements, providing wide-ranging support, as well as legitimacy, to the group.

Though social media has ushered in a new era of global community, citizen journalism and information sharing, many academics would advise against buying into the belief that social media, and social media alone, has led to some of the most dramatic social upheavals of recent history. Rather, Jon B. Alterman argues in “The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” that it was social media’s ability to empower individuals and convey information to the traditional media that made it a tool of revolutionaries, not a revolutionary force in and of itself.

Nonetheless, social media has facilitated the opening of closed societies and in this new era of global interconnectivity, it will continue to mobilize and connect individuals around the world, shifting traditional means of geopolitics to a more population-centric approach.

The latest survey by the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs shows that 5% of Afghanis living in urban areas are addicted to opium, compared to .03% in the U.S.  Additionally, the percentage of the population addicted to opium in rural areas is projected to be in the double digits. This makes Afghanistan the country with the highest addiction to opiates worldwide. Further, Helmand and Kandahar, two of the most instable provinces in Afghanistan, are also the largest producers of opium. This linkage between opium production and corruption illuminates the importance of tackling the production of poppy.

Relative peace and stability following the withdrawal of U.S. forces is predicated on the subjugation of the Taliban insurgency, making efforts to stem their funding ever more important. Initiatives by the U.S. government to combat the production of opiates involve enforcing and strengthening the rule of law and the criminal justice system.  However, the popularity of informal law at the tribal level, coupled with the paradoxical meshing of Shariah Law with common law, make the establishment of a transparent legal system extremely challenging.

Amy Schimisseur, Team Lead for the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Afghanistan Counter-narcotics, spoke at an event held at Georgetown University called Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond, about initiatives in place to change attitudes and behaviors regarding the production and trafficking of opium.  One initiative is the Counternarcotics Public Information Initiative (CNPI), which disseminates public information and awareness through Afghan media outlets, NGOs and government agencies regarding the effects of the poppy crop.  Local leaders are being trained to hold community councils on the dangers of drug use and Preventative Drug Education initiatives within public schools have also sought to stem drug use at an early age.

Economic aid also acts as an important tool to encourage the destruction of opium crops and to provide opportunities for development. A widely successful initiative is the Good Performers Initiative (GPI). The program involves incentivizing provinces to eradicate opium production in return for development assistance ($1 million USD/year) for sustainable infrastructure projects such as schools, roads and sports stadiums.  The project ideas come from local villages within the given province and the contracts are awarded to Afghan companies.  This not only incentivizes governments to eradicate poppy production, it also employs local Afghans and builds capacity.

Even though troop withdrawals will take place, the U.S. plans to continue its war with the Taliban nonviolently on both the governmental and civil society fronts.  It is essential that the rule of law provide citizens with security, consistency of expectations, and protection by and from government.  With the prospect of the Taliban trying to make a move after the majority of U.S. troops have left, the capacity of civil society and the government, as well as economic development and market opportunities, will be necessary to combat insurgency movements.

Turkey has deep-rooted economic ties with Russia due to oil and natural gas dependence – it imports 10% of its oil and 58% of its natural gas from the former Soviet Union. Although less reliant on Iranian energy imports, Turkey is still invested in maintaining relations with Iran for geographic, political, and security reasons.  Compounded with an increasingly strong alliance between Russia and Iran, Turkey is in a difficult situation as it tries to balance relations with the U.S. and Western Europe. Though militarily Turkey’s behavior seems to align with that of NATO, economically, Turkey’s decision-making looks eastward.

However, this algorithm may not work for long as Turkey’s economic and security affairs collide. Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions against the country have already created a rift in the U.S.-Turkish alliance and could lead to major strategic problems for Turkey. Additionally, Russia and Iran remain the main suppliers of weapons to the Assad regime, yet Turkey is the main supporter of the Free Syrian Army and its border with Syria has come under fire prompting a U.S.-Turkish military buildup.

Though Turkey’s ties to the U.S. loom large in its decision-making process, it has had no qualms in the past about bucking U.S. interests for its own. This policy has received much support at home as both PM Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul maintain high levels of popular support and have benefited from a policy that seems to put Turkey first, relegating international political demands to the back burner. For example, if Turkey is not admitted to the EU, Erdogan has threatened that it might be strategically advantageous for it to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia and China. With Iran as an observer state, Turkey’s admittance to this organization could shift its allegiances further east, dissolving ties with the EU and the United States. Shared values, along with booming economies in China and Turkey, may make the SCO increasingly attractive as the EU continues to drag its feet on Turkey’s admission.

President Obama’s brokering an Israeli apology to Turkey for the death of eight Turkish humanitarian workers during the Gaza flotilla raid of 2010 may be signaling Turkey’s turning back to the West. Finding itself at a global crossroads, Turkey will have to determine which allegiances are more beneficial for its long-term political, security and economic interests. But in the short-term, it is more likely to walk a fine diplomatic line to keep itself in favor in both East and West.

As the Syrian Civil War moves into what will be its third year of conflict, coverage of the topic has become repetitive with little fluctuation as the war itself stagnates and the international community has failed to act significantly. However, reports that Assad’s regime may be using chemical weapons to defeat rebel forces have brought Syria back to the forefront.

At its start, the Syrian civil war was on the front page of every newspaper.  Recently, the news coming out of Syria has been given less importance.  The majority of stories relates to the success of the rebels or the politics of the rebellion, which are often isolated to the back pages of the news.  Whereas military gains and losses were a novelty in the early days of the war, the impasse in fighting and significant loss of human life have made the issue more discouraging than a triumph of the Arab Spring.

When examining online media sites, recent articles about the war are abundant when searched, but they are rarely seen as headlines on the home page.  For the most part, these stories focus on one or two strategic gains, political developments in the rebellion, rocket attacks on various neighborhoods or the increasing number of Syrian refugees.  Though these stories are similar to the ones that grabbed headlines less than two years ago, they have been downgraded in significance, becoming stale as little has changed over the past two years.

In the past month however, the Syrian civil war has found its way back to more prominent areas of the media space (see graph).  Since February, there have been several articles relaying the international community’s concern over the possible use of chemical weapons from Assad’s arsenal by either side; the use of which could force international action.  Israel has recently come forth claiming that chemical weapons were in fact used this past week in Syria.  While the news has engendered a skeptical response from some within the international community, including the U.S., it has mentioned that the alleged attacks are being investigated for more concrete proof.

News stories about the war have escalated in the past month as the West has denounced chemical weapons and indicated that their use would mark a significant turning point in international intervention.  The use of these weapons, if proven true, may lead to a revival of awareness in the Syrian conflict as the world awaits international action in this civil war.  If not, it seems that the Syrian civil war will continue on a similar trajectory with the media following suit.

Sentiment map courtesy of RecordedFuture

The Obama Administration’s use of drones has become an increasingly contentious issue as this lethal tactic continues to provoke negative sentiment around the world.  The covert nature of drone strikes and their classified nature have led to disapproval among some Americans.  Many are calling for more transparency in the Obama administration’s use of drones, demanding policies be put in place to limit the president’s unilateral capacity to call the shots on drone strikes.

The U.S.’s use of drones to combat violent extremists has been on the rise in countries including Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While drones have played an important role in taking out key terrorists on America’s “Kill List,” civilian casualties as a result of drone strikes have produced growing anti-American sentiment across the Middle East. Protests against drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan, have received worldwide attention.

On the other hand, drone use has undeniable advantages in that they result in zero U.S. casualties and the drones’ missiles are extremely accurate.  A study by the New America Foundation estimates that since 2004, between 2000 and 3300 militants were killed, while between 250 and 400 civilian causalities occurred as a result of these operations. Notably, the non-militant fatality rate under President Obama was only 14%, compared to 46% under President Bush. Furthermore, a 2013 RAND study argues that the U.S. drone program “reduces militant violence by increasing the costs of militant activities and creating an incentive for militants to lie low to avoid being targeted.” However, drones are viewed by many countries around the world as a breach of national sovereignty and an example of American disregard for innocent civilians’ lives. It is interesting to note that coverage of drones has been dominated by a negative narrative (see chart above) until very recently when the Obama Administration acknowledged the program and began providing legal justifications for it.

Former Director of the NSA and CIA, Michael Hayden, recently elaborated on the administration’s argument, stating that approval of drone strikes is rooted in national perception –because the U.S. believes it is engaged in a global war on terrorism, it can use the legality of war to justify targeted killings. However, the administration still lacks a clear communications effort both within the U.S. and in target countries that explains the military benefits of the U.S. policy. Perhaps because of this, many are beginning to believe that drones do more harm than good; Hayden emphasized that even if drone strikes are legitimate and effective, “the secondary and tertiary effects of this kind of activity [political blowback within the target countries] may now begin to outweigh the sought-after primary effect which is to reduce the level of threat.”

Ultimately, drone use is a short-term solution to a much bigger problem. Getting to the root cause of extremist movements will require the U.S. to generate more support in volatile regions around the world.

China’s efforts put an interesting twist on the U.S.’s own public diplomacy attempts to reach international audiences in an attempt to bolster U.S. objectives abroad, whether through Twitter diplomacy, education exchanges or other similar efforts.

As China becomes both an economic and political power, the threat it poses to U.S. supremacy has given China a global image problem. To thwart this perception, China has leveraged showcase events like the 2008 Beijing Winter Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, in addition to more traditional methods of strengthening Chinese soft power.

Chinese diplomatic efforts in the U.S. have focused primarily on advertising campaigns and other soft power initiatives to drive positive public opinion of China. Notably, the government-run Xinhua News (with an office in NYC) has a national broadcasting station in the U.S. as well as online resources.  Other efforts include the Confucius Institutes which aim to promote cross-cultural exchanges, although they are sometimes viewed as “Chinese foreign propagandists.”

The Chinese government’s soft power initiatives also help to satisfy the country’s seemingly insatiable demand for natural resources.  The Chinese government’s work in Africa trade infrastructure development for access to the continent’s natural resources. However, rumors of human rights violations and lack of adherence to democratic principles in general make diplomatic efforts essential for China in this region. The expansion of China’s state news agency Xinhua to Nairobi, Kenya, is meant to thwart biased Western views of China. Particularly in countries where China takes an investment-for-resource approach to foreign policy, effective public diplomacy efforts are vital.

Generating credibility is at the root of public diplomacy efforts and China’s “peaceful rise’ is contingent on its ability to effectively target and influence audiences in the U.S. and abroad. With billions invested so far, will China improve its image among Americans and even best American influence in diplomacy efforts in Africa and worldwide?

In Pakistan, madrassas, or Muslim seminary schools, are often funded by Saudi Arabia and Pakistani extremist groups acting under the umbrella of charity organizations, or more moderate groups supported by the government’s limited and less-than-successful attempts at restructuring public education. Religion plays an integral role in developing positive social networks, especially in low-income areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber, and Southern Punjab, as many citizens rely on madrassas as their most legitimate source of education, employment, and humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, this has also turned educational centers into prime recruiting ground for well-funded extremist groups that can offer educational/humanitarian aid and employment in exchange for adhesion to extremist ideals.

Though these madrassas have been successful, WORDE’s study has shown that with proper funding and support, moderate faith-based civil society organizations (CSO) can be very effective in combating militant jihadi networks as their perceived legitimacy is already higher than that of an international organization or even the government, itself.

Coordinating with senior community leaders, one could reach Pakistanis at grass-roots levels and promote peace the same way extremists promote violence: advocating for social cohesion, non-violent conflict resolution, and interethnic and interfaith dialogue justified by Islam through public awareness campaigns, issued Fatwas /public statements and public debates against extremism or rallies that increase exposure in the traditional and social media spaces.

The U.S. has a tradition of pulling funding and assistance from countries after it disengages from them militarily. Although the U.S. has no combat boots on the ground in Pakistan, a centerpiece of foreign policy between the two countries must include continuing civilian assistance to Pakistan, public diplomacy efforts and partnerships with moderate CSOs.