Female Jihadists Part I: Defining the Role of Women in Jihad

Strategic Social is pleased to introduce the first in what will be a series of posts on the topic of “female jihadists.”  The term “female jihadists” refers to women who are used to actively support violent extremist groups in the Islamic World, ranging from nationalist groups like the remnants of the Iraqi Baath Party, to Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups like the Palestinian organization HAMAS, to Salafist-jihadists groups like Al-Qaeda.  Strategic Social believes that understanding the role of female jihadists in supporting these groups is one of the keys to combating violent extremism around the world.

This first post will cover the subject of how certain Islamic principles have been applied to justify having women play an active role in jihadist organizations.  Over time, Strategic Social will post additional analyses on other topics related to the phenomenon of female jihadists, including the following:

• The use of Islamic religious scriptures to recruit female jihadists;
• A comparison of female jihadists in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq;
• The use of female suicide bombers in the war in Iraq;
• Islamic religious authorities’ rulings (which are called “fatwas” in Arabic) related to female jihadists;
• Factors that make women susceptible to recruitment by jihadist organizations.

Strategic Social recognizes that this is a complex topic – one could probably write an entire book just on the debate over the word “jihad” and what it means.  This series is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of female jihadists.  Rather, our intent is more to raise awareness of the issues surrounding this phenomenon and the implications for policymakers and security officials.

There have been signs in recent years that violent extremist groups in the Islamic World are increasingly using female jihadists to advance their causes.  One of the most visible and troubling signs of this development has been the use of women to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. The first two female suicide bombers in Iraq appeared in the very early stage of  Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, a few days before the Coalition Forces captured Baghdad. Radical insurgents have turned to this tactic because not only do such attacks provide a capability to inflict mass casualties and inspire fear in local populations, but also because female bombers are more likely to slip past security measures.  Female suicide bombers have presented a particular problem, in spite of the general security gains achieved in Iraq in recent years, because the motivations of the women who become suicide bombers are often not well understood. There are a number of factors that can play into a woman making such a decision, but one of the most concerning reasons is the use of various interpretations of Islamic scriptures to encourage women to become suicide bombers. There is an entire chapter, the “Surat al-Nisa’a”, dedicated to the treatment of women in the Quran, the holy book of Islam, and one of the last recommendations of Prophet Mohammed before his death was for his followers to take care of mothers, wives and daughters, whom he described as fragile and delicate “phials.” These facts lead us to wonder whether female suicide bombers are active collaborators in violent extremist activities, or if they are victims.

To more thoroughly understand the role women play in supporting jihadist organizations and causes, we should first examine the meaning of the word “jihad.”  “Al-Jihad fi sabil Allah,” or “striving in the way of God,” is a frequently used idiomatic expression that when studied in depth reveals that there are several meanings the word “jihad.” Though the most commonly accepted interpretation of “jihad” is some sort of violent struggle or military combat, the actual meaning of the word “jihad” really means something more akin to “struggle”, and in particular struggle against temptation and to improve  one’s self and one’s society. This definition is often referred to as “the Greater Jihad.[i]” Some Muslims also refer to “Lesser Jihad[ii]”, which can refer to two things.  The first of these is “Fardh A’yn”, which means “an individual’s duty”, in particular the duty of Muslims to protect Muslim lands and other Muslims from invasions by external powers through active participation in combat.  There is also the form of “Lesser Jihad” known as “Fardh Kifaya” or “collective duty,” which refers to an obligation to support those who protect Muslims from invaders and occupiers in some way, but does not require an individual to participate in armed conflict.

In the early days of Islam, the participation of women in jihad was usually limited to raising and donating money in support of jihadist campaigns. Traditionally, a woman would have to receive the approval of the male head of the household, usually either her husband or her father, before engaging in any activities other than her regular household chores. Some jihadists have begun to issue new interpretations of how women can participate in jihad.  In these interpretations, support for jihad is identified as an important Islamic duty, on par with such obligations as praying on a daily basis and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. As such, it is something that a woman does not need a man’s permission in order to do.

However, most jihadist propaganda advocates that a women’s role in supporting jihad should generally take place within the context of traditional female roles within Islamic societies.  A significant portion of jihadist propaganda[iii] advocates the position that women are the backbone of a well-bred, strong Islamic nation, and as such, traditional women’s roles as wife and mother are extremely important, and women can contribute to jihad within the context of these roles.  For example, they can support jihad by running the household while her husband is away participating in jihadist campaigns in other parts of the world.  They can teach their children about Islam and the obligations of jihad for Muslims, so that their children will become active in jihad when they grow up.  They can convince their husbands that Islam obligates them to abandon their interest in world pleasures and risk their lives by enlisting in jihadist groups.  These types of activities are portrayed as being the correct way for women to support the existence of Islam as a faith.  If a woman wants to support jihad more directly, she is welcome to do so.

Some observers have mistakenly interpreted jihadists’ call for women to participate in the Lesser Jihad as a form of “liberation” for women. On the contrary, these jihadists tend to firmly state their disapproval of the Western values of liberating women, which they view as anathema to Islam. Instead, jihadists see the traditional roles played by wives and mothers as an important component of Islam, and see women’s participation in jihad as a natural extension of those roles, rather than as a challenge or a contrast to them.

Nowhere in the Quran does it explicitly say that it is acceptable for women (or men, for that matter) to carry out violent acts like suicide bombing.  The fact that some jihadists are advocating such roles for women in violent jihadist campaigns is concerning because they tend to target and exploit women who are not particularly knowledgeable about Islam and who are not familiar with the subtleties of the various types and meanings of concepts like jihad. They expose an urgent need for policymakers in places like Iraq and Afghanistan to find ways to promote things like education and employment opportunities to help Muslim women feel more independent, more confident, and better able to make decisions for themselves–thus making them less susceptible to recruitment by violent extremists who base their appeals on questionable interpretations of Islamic principles.

We will provide further discussion of factors that make women in the Islamic World more susceptible to recruitment by violent extremists in future parts of this series.

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[i] See this BBC piece and this essay by the late Grand Ayatollah Rullah Mousavi Khomeini for more background on the concept of “greater Jihad.”

 

 

 

[ii] Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh, The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the al-Qaida Network, Roman & Littlefield Publishers, U.K. 2007

[iii] We apologize, but this source appears to only be available in Arabic.

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Dhafra Al-Azzawi is a Senior Analyst at Strategic Social.  She produces analytic reports on political, economic, social, and military affairs in Iraq in support of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).  Her areas of particular expertise include Iraqi insurgent and extremist groups, Iraqi political affairs, the history and theology of Islam, and developments in Iraqi and Pan-Arab media.  Dhafra is a native Iraqi and lived in Iraq until 2005; as such, she witnessed firsthand all the wars that took in Iraq over the course of her lifetime, dating back to the start of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. These experiences have given her outstanding insight into the changes that Iraqis have experienced in the economic, social, political, religious, and security environments as a result of these wars.

Dhafra holds an M.S. in Foreign Affairs and International Security from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, as well as an M.A. in English Literature and a Bachelor of Arts degree, with a minor in Psychology, from the University of Baghdad.  As part of her studies for her Master’s degree at Georgetown, Dhafra took courses in subjects such as media and world affairs, terrorism and counterterrorism, security issues in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, uses of and roles for intelligence in US foreign policy, and conflict prevention in international affairs.   In addition to being a native Arabic speaker and being fluent in English, Dhafra is currently learning how to speak and read Farsi.

Prior to delving into the realm of international affairs, Dhafra worked as a professor at the University of Baghdad teaching courses in English Literature and Phonetics & Phonology, and she was the chairperson of the English Department at the Baghdad International School. From 2003-2004, she was the chief supervisor of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) Facility Management Office, which was responsible for managing all publicly-owned property in Iraq, a veritable behemoth of a task, given the extent to which, under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the government and the ruling Baath Party controlled properties and industries.  Dhafra also worked as a consular assistant at the US Embassy in Baghdad where she assisted with processing visa applications submitted by Iraqi nationals to come to the United States, and performed services such as interviewing applicants and certifying the authenticity of documents that they provided.

Dhafra has recently begun writing posts for Strategic Social’s blog, which covers developments related to new media/Web 2.0, international relations, irregular warfare, Information Operations, and Strategic Communications/Public Diplomacy.   Dhafra is currently writing a series of posts on female jihadists in the Islamic World, which will cover topics such as how Islamic extremist groups use religion to recruit women, rulings by various Sunni and Shia religious authorities related to women’s participation in jihadist activities, and the use of female suicide bombers in Iraq.